Two months after Ukrainian forces launched their incursion into Russia’s Kursk region, the occupation of Russian territory has become a mundane reality. Ukrainian troops have firmly established themselves, set up military command posts, and shared videos of their interactions with the local population. Russian officials’ promised rapid “expulsion of the enemy” has now extended into its third month. While Russians try to ignore the invasion — just as they try to ignore the broader war — the fighting in Kursk remains a source of concern. Political scientist Ekaterina Schulmann notes that under autocratic rule, most Russians feel a lack of agency, leading them to show little interest in the events in Kursk, despite the “enemy occupation.” Instead, Russians are much more worried that the situation will lead to a new mobilization. The state capitalizes on their apathy. Even as they continue to downplay the significance of the Kursk operation, Russian officials frame the events as evidence that Putin would prefer de-escalation, arguing that he is simply being “forced to respond” to enemy actions.
The ambiguity of Russia’s official stance
A political leader’s response to any event can be gauged either by their actions or by their rhetoric. Decisions are made, such as appointing or dismissing officials, deploying troops, creating new agencies, or reorganizing old ones. These decisions are accompanied by public rhetoric: addresses to the nation, meetings with subordinates, and communication with the public. The late Venezuelan leader Hugo Chávez, for instance, would sing and play guitar for hours on national television — this was his unique form of public communication.
Response rate
The percentage of people in the sample who actually respond to the survey or questionnaire.
Spiral of silence effect
The spiral of silence effect is a social theory that explains how people may withhold their opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority or when their views go against the dominant or majority opinion. The theory, introduced by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974, suggests that individuals are often reluctant to express their views, especially on controversial topics, out of fear of social isolation or negative repercussions.
It would be inaccurate to say that the Russian commander-in-chief has completely ignored what is happening in the Kursk Region. Despite his tendency to disappear and wait things out when unexpected events occur, Putin began addressing the Kursk incursion relatively quickly. He first commented on the incident on Aug. 7, the day after the border breach, during a meeting with government officials.
The invasion was initially labeled as “yet another provocation,” albeit a “major” one. Later, it was described as an “act of banditry and terrorism targeting civilians.” This narrative was reinforced by Russia’s declaration of its Kursk, Bryansk, and Belgorod regions as zones of a counter-terrorist operation (CTO). The responsibility for conducting a CTO falls not on the military, but on the Federal Security Service (FSB), suggesting that this is not a confrontation between two armies, but rather a struggle between the FSB and some isolated groups of terrorists and bandits.
A week after the start of the Kursk operation, Russian officials were most often referring to it as a “situation that has developed.” Note the use of the past participle: the situation supposedly “developed” on its own, emerging from internal dynamics rather than external forces, and it did so long ago — not a situation currently unfolding, but one that has already “taken shape.”
According to Russian social anthropologist Alexandra Arkhipova, such phrasing is a classic example of softening euphemisms — a form of Orwellian “Newspeak” meant to blur the public’s perception of something dangerous, alarming, or harmful. A similar tactic was employed by Russia’s Central Election Commission when it canceled elections in several of the Kursk Region’s districts, citing “territorial uncertainty” — a term reminiscent of the language used in Russian media during the Chechen campaigns of the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Response rate
The percentage of people in the sample who actually respond to the survey or questionnaire.
Spiral of silence effect
The spiral of silence effect is a social theory that explains how people may withhold their opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority or when their views go against the dominant or majority opinion. The theory, introduced by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974, suggests that individuals are often reluctant to express their views, especially on controversial topics, out of fear of social isolation or negative repercussions.
Softening euphemisms are aimed at blurring our perception of what is dangerous, frightening, and harmful.
At the same time, there are also numerous reports about how the entire country is assisting the Kursk Region’s residents, who have been “forced to leave their homes” (without any explanation of the reasons). Anyone who used Russia’s Gosuslugi state services portal in August would have encountered two appeals: one encouraging support for the Kursk Region’s local residents through purchases from the e-commerce websites Ozon and Wildberries, and another urging users to post advertisements on Avito — Russia’s version of eBay — offering free housing for refugees.
While the reasons behind the residents of Kursk becoming refugees remain unspecified, every citizen of Russia was informed via Gosuslugi that unnamed malicious forces were harming people in the region, prompting their departure.
Response rate
The percentage of people in the sample who actually respond to the survey or questionnaire.
Spiral of silence effect
The spiral of silence effect is a social theory that explains how people may withhold their opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority or when their views go against the dominant or majority opinion. The theory, introduced by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974, suggests that individuals are often reluctant to express their views, especially on controversial topics, out of fear of social isolation or negative repercussions.
The overarching policy concerning the Kursk issue is to minimize visibility. While discussing it is not prohibited, conversations should avoid the context of war and instead focus on acts of terrorism. Attention can be directed to the social assistance provided by the state through governors, as well as to the support from Russian society, including the efforts of compassionate citizens, dedicated volunteers, and other members of the community. However, one should not anticipate rapid results; the expulsion of hostile forces will be gradual, not swift.
This rhetorical framework has remained almost unchanged for two months.
Loyalists vs. “hawks”
Russian reports in the early days speaking of their successful “expulsion” and repeated “destruction” of invading enemy groups did not come from the usual official spokespeople, but rather from Apti Alaudinov, the commander of the Chechen special forces grouping in the area. It wasn’t until Aug. 12 that Andrei Kartapolov, head of the State Duma’s Defense Committee, spoke out. However, Kartapolov did not discuss how decisively the Russian military (or FSB special forces) were defeating the enemy; instead, he asserted that there was no need for mobilization, addressing a key concern within Russian society.
Although Alaudinov holds an official position in the Ministry of Defense, he acted more like a field commander of the Akhmat battalion. This caused considerable irritation among ultra-militarists and Russian radicals, primarily for ethnic reasons. They generally dislike it when a Chechen speaks on behalf of the Russian state, and based on their bitter experiences from past years, they are preemptively annoyed by the persuasive tone and grandiose descriptions of captures, the destruction of enemy equipment and personnel, and other stylistic features characteristic of the “TikTok troops” who make up Ramzan Kadyrov’s forces.
Response rate
The percentage of people in the sample who actually respond to the survey or questionnaire.
Spiral of silence effect
The spiral of silence effect is a social theory that explains how people may withhold their opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority or when their views go against the dominant or majority opinion. The theory, introduced by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974, suggests that individuals are often reluctant to express their views, especially on controversial topics, out of fear of social isolation or negative repercussions.
Ultra-militarists dislike it when Chechens speak on behalf of the Russian state.
Meanwhile, television propaganda talk shows painted for their audience a picture of paradoxical diversity. The incoherent din of propaganda can be divided into two opposing camps: loyalists and “hawks” — radically different groups that openly despise one another. In their reactions to the events in Kursk, these factions clashed with astonishing ferocity. The loyalists are protectors, who value authority über alles, while the “hawks” are radical militarists. For example, former State Duma MP Natalia Narochnitskaya, who advocates for conducting carpet bombing in the Kursk Region, represents the “hawks,” whereas television host Vladimir Solovyov, at least among certain circles, is understood to embody the loyalist camp.
These groups harbor far more animosity toward one another than they do toward all liberals and “foreign agents” combined. The radical militarists have another target of disdain: the “wrong people” — passive, cowardly individuals preoccupied with consumption and their personal lives, who are neither willing to fight nor prepared to do so unless motivated by money.
Response rate
The percentage of people in the sample who actually respond to the survey or questionnaire.
Spiral of silence effect
The spiral of silence effect is a social theory that explains how people may withhold their opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority or when their views go against the dominant or majority opinion. The theory, introduced by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974, suggests that individuals are often reluctant to express their views, especially on controversial topics, out of fear of social isolation or negative repercussions.
Radical militarists resent the “wrong people,” who are passive, cowardly, and unwilling to fight unless motivated by money.
The mass exodus of Russian residents from the Kursk Region has incited outrage in these circles. In their worldview, every rural citizen should transform their home into a fortress, unearth an imaginary Berdan rifle — or, at the very least, arm themselves with pitchforks — and ultimately be willing to sacrifice themselves in order to stop the invaders. They believe this is how it was during the Great Patriotic War — an understanding shaped by vague notions derived from Soviet films and children’s theater. When reality fails to align with this narrative, militarists are left both astonished and indignant.
What surveys do and do not reveal
What do the citizens themselves think about what is happening? Before discussing the reaction of “ordinary Russians,” we must return to the eternal question: how can one discern and assess the trajectory of public opinion under conditions of war, repression, and censorship?
Response rate
The percentage of people in the sample who actually respond to the survey or questionnaire.
Spiral of silence effect
The spiral of silence effect is a social theory that explains how people may withhold their opinions when they perceive themselves to be in the minority or when their views go against the dominant or majority opinion. The theory, introduced by German political scientist Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann in 1974, suggests that individuals are often reluctant to express their views, especially on controversial topics, out of fear of social isolation or negative repercussions.
