I wonder if in Russia there will ever be an adequate system for recognizing not only car license plates, but also the cars themselves on which they are installed, as well as the people in them? How was it possible, under the current conditions, to allow an active serviceman of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to cross the state border without establishing total control over him?
Today, you can easily change license plates several times a month, even on conspicuous cars. This still does not cause suspicion in video recording systems if the vehicle does not have wanted license plates.
Modern systems automatically signal the operator to stop and check a suspicious vehicle. But not in Russia. How could it be possible to “lose” a car that drove from a problematic, to put it mildly, zone where hostilities are taking place?
Someone will have a reasonable question that when a good system works, external surveillance units and state security units may encounter problems. No. Such systems have been operating successfully for a long time in many countries around the world, and are able to retouch both the faces and vehicles of emergency services, without giving the system operator information protected by law.
But here in Russia, it seems, a different principle works: the main thing is not the performance and functionality of the systems, but the loyalty of those who win the relevant government contracts.
https://t.me/vchkogpu/32349
VChK-OGPU
Back on April 13, one of the sites collecting data about Ukrainian security forces published an identity card and a large photo of Natalya Pavlovna Shaban, born in 1979, as a serviceman of the Azov regiment. Four months later, Shaban used his other last name, Vovk, instead of…
“ВЧК ОГПУ”