According to information from the Cheka-OGPU, Myazin, who is now trying to leave the colony on parole, and Kulikov (at large), having learned about Fomin’s new testimony, immediately launched unprecedented activity. And such activity yielded results. 10 days after Fomin’s interrogation, a provocation was committed against him. During an evening check on the territory of FKU IK-6 of the Federal Penitentiary Service, under the badge (tag) on Fomin’s winter jacket, colony officers discovered an object similar to a SIM card. However, he himself never held this item in his hands or used it. Fomin himself immediately announced that this item had been planted on him. Such a violation allows Fomin to be sent to a punishment cell, placed under special control, and prevented from receiving parole. In general, make future life in the colony unbearable.
According to the Cheka-OGPU, the provocation was organized at the level of individual employees of the UFIN of the Tula region and the IK itself, their names are known to the Editorial Board.
Among other things, Fomin said that the control service of Deutsche bank at one time developed a shadow banker, co-owner of Promsberbank Alexei Kulikov, who was a close friend of the head of the banking department of the Directorate of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation Dmitry Frolov. It was also developed by its partners from Deutsche Bank. As the bank’s control service established, Kulikov was closely acquainted with the then head of the Moscow office, Jerg Bongartz, who brought him to the bank. As a result, part of the financial flows of the laundering platform based on Promsberbank went through Deutsche Bank. Then the control service became interested in the dubious companies, and payments through them were frozen. Kulikova decided to bribe an employee of the internal control department of Deutsche Bank at a meeting that took place in a cafe on the ground floor of an office building occupied by the bank. During the conversation, Kulikov typed a five-digit dollar figure on his smartphone. He offered such a bribe every month in order to turn a blind eye to dubious transactions through Deutsche Bank. The control officer refused and reported to his superiors. As a result, Promsberbank lost the ability to launder money through Deutsche Bank. However, then the following happened. Kulikov and partners began to buy existing financial companies with a history and, among other things, already allowed to work as clients of Deutsche Bank. And through them, payments with dirty money continued until a certain period. For some reason, Deutsche Bank decided not to wash dirty linen in public; this whole story remained inside the bank.
“ВЧК ОГПУ”
